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The emission of greenhouse gases has contributed to the alarming conditions such as global 
warming, climate change, and as well as, reduction of the fossil fuels that has an adverse 
effect on the planet. People, society and government must step up to combat these issues 
before it takes full-fledged state. 
 
With the arrival of electric vehicles, it is deemed benevolent in cutting carbon emissions and 
abandoning traditional fossil-fuel cars. The aim to achieve high number of people adopting 
electric vehicles (EV) vehicles amply depends on the corresponding EV charging stations.  
 
Currently, there are large number of AC charging station solution for EVs. However, the 
challenges that come with AC charging station such as time consumption during charging 
and requirement of on-board charger are pushing people back from adopting electric vehi-
cles. The DC charging station overcome the problem that lies in AC charging station.   
IoT driven infrastructure transforms business and industry by offering efficiency and safety 
to a new height. Current charging infrastructure must implement this technology to ease the 
process for charging electric vehicle, and finally make it possible to, control the charging 
process according to the need from user’s device such as smart phone. Unfortunately, with 
the rapid development in the field of IoT driven EV charging station, manufacturers are more 
concerned to secure their place in the market and focus on launching their product as soon 
as possible leaving doors open for cybersecurity threats and exploitation. 
 
The thesis project aims to develop secure design for smart IoT driven fast DC charging 
infrastructure for electric vehicles. The research evaluates the potential security risks asso-
ciated with IoT components including EV and EV charging infrastructure and presents the 
detail secure design considerations that need to be applied in the IoT EV charging station 
implementation. This thesis presents the baseline security recommendations for IoT enabled 
charging infrastructure after carrying out asset and threat taxonomy of the given IoT infra-
structure. Since the entire practical thesis has included enterprise level secret matter as well 
as business sensitive information, the public version of the thesis does not report the rele-
vant materials and information implemented in the project.  
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1 Introduction 
The emission of greenhouse gases from growing number of fossil-fuel vehicles around 
the world has an adverse effect on the climate of the earth. This heavy reliance on diesel 
cars assist on reducing the amount of fossil fuels available in the earth. The emission 
scandal in 2015, in which Volkswagen’s cars included a programming software which 
provided false emission value from their vehicles, exposed the drawbacks of Europe’s 
dependence on fossil-fuel cars. 
 The advent of electric vehicles (EV), an option to shift away from fossil-fuel cars, and 
with mass adoption on the horizon, the demand for the EV charging stations will be in-
evitable. However, the challenges lying with current charging stations such as AC slow 
charging approach; which can take 8 to 12 hours to fully charge an EV, insecure design; 
that is void of proper authentication and authorization between EV and charging station, 
lack of secure payment system, issues of load balancing, have made EV undesirable 
over traditional gasoline vehicles.  
With the emergence of Internet of Things (IoT), a concept that combine a wide ecosys-
tem of interconnected services and devices, EV and EV Charging system must embrace 
these technology for overcoming the barriers that lies in current charging system. Fur-
thermore, DC charging method need to be implemented to overcome the barrier of slow 
charging. A smart DC charging infrastructure is composed of electric vehicle, electric 
vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), connectors connecting vehicle to EVSE and secure 
network connecting EVSE to the IoT cloud service to transmit data using secured wire-
less technology.  The IoT cloud service offer applications that receive, analyze and man-
age data in real-time to assist EV users in making real time decision that would enhance 
the quality of EV charging. EV user will communicate with the charging station using 
application on their smartphones. However, with the evolving IoT, insecure and vulnera-
ble; IoT components, communication protocols, cloud platform are critical threats that 
need to be solved before deploying smart charging infrastructure. The security of the 
entire smart charging infrastructure comes down not only to defining secure interconnec-
tion points, but also implementing secure products to begin with. These products include 
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the electric vehicle, charging controller in EV and EVSE, sensors or even the network 
protocols connecting IoT enabled devices in EV charging station to the cloud. With a 
view to understand how to design and develop IoT enabled DC charging infrastructure, 
it is important to understand what challenges are to be faced when deciding security 
approach. 
The thesis project was carried out for Unified Chargers Ltd, whose main objective was 
developing secure, compact and smart fast DC charging infrastructure for electric vehi-
cles. The research evaluates the potential security risks associated with IoT enabled 
charging infrastructure and presents the detail secure design of EV charging ecosystem. 
The thesis strives to answer the following questions: 
1) What action should the case company adopt to develop secure design for IoT 
enabled smart DC charging infrastructure? 
2) What actions should the case company adopt to overcome the issue of AC slow 
charging station?   
The thesis mainly concentrates on designing, that encompass security and privacy, and 
building DC fast charging infrastructure prototype. The charging infrastructure presented 
in this thesis is described and compared against existing charging infrastructure. In this 
work, the EVs are charged at public location with CCS standard chargers and focus on 
implementation of the controlled charging environment between EV and charging station 
with secure and privacy intact. The communication between charging station and elec-
tricity provider as well as functions of power grid as the part of infrastructure are out of 
the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis contains 6 sections. Following the introduction, section 2 analysis the current 
scenario of EV Charging system. Section 3 focuses on the methods that were used to 
design secure EV charging system. Section 4 identifies and explores relevant theory, 
and risk assessment based on the study carried out by ENISA [1] is presented in section 
5. The method of designed system, network protocols and security measures are pre-
sented in section 6. Finally, section 7 summarizes the work carried out as part of the 
thesis and presents the conclusions and limitation of the smart IoT driven charging infra-
structure. 
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2 Current EV Charging Infrastructure Analysis 
Electric vehicles, in general, are the means of transportation that runs on electric power 
rather than the traditional vehicles that depend on fossil fuels. There are two types of 
electric vehicle currently available in Finland that are Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
(PHEV) and Plug-in Electric Vehicle (PEV). Currently, Finland has two levels of existing 
charging infrastructures, AC charging station and DC charging station, to provide electric 
charging service to electric vehicles. The AC charging station, also known as slow charg-
ing station are suitable for home or office charging, however, DC charging station which 
offer fast charging are appropriate for public charging. The DC charging station signifi-
cantly reduce time to charge the EV compared to AC charging. For instance, depending 
upon: the maximum power supply the charging station can offer, electric vehicle’s battery 
size and maximum power battery can accept, DC charging process can fully charge an 
electric vehicle in 10 to 30 minutes. 
 
 
        Figure 1: Total number of Plug-in EV charging infrastructure in Finland. [1] 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of AC charging stations, presented in blue and 
red colors, are comparatively higher in number than the DC charging stations combining 
CHAdeMO, CCS and Tesla SC standards. Although the number of EVs are increasing 
in Finland, unavailability of sizable number of fast charging stations prevents people from 
embracing EVs. Furthermore, the time taken to charge the electric vehicle, make AC 
charging station insignificant at public location. 
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With the rapid development in the field of IoT driven EV charging station, manufacturers 
are concerned to secure their place in the market and focused on launching their product 
quickly leaving doors open for cybersecurity threats and exploitation. Moreover, in case 
of some companies, insufficient budget and time for developing IoT products resulted in 
vulnerable and insecure products. The article published in Kaspersky Lab by Mathias 
Dalheimer [2], raised the issues concerning vulnerabilities of EV charging infrastructure. 
The author claimed that the paying and charging implementation in current charging sta-
tion lacked sanctity of personal data and money of the respected user. Dalheimer, fur-
ther, examined and studied different components of the system and revealed that each 
of them had issues with security. The vulnerabilities ranging from ID tokens provided by 
third-party providers; which was void of encryption, to the implementation of old version 
of OCPP protocol; which is based on HTTP uses no encryption for transaction, opened 
the door for man-in-the-middle attacks by relaying the transaction and contributing ex-
ploitation of the system. 
Furthermore, the charging station Dalheimer examined had USB ports that paved the 
way for attacker to: copy all the logs and configuration data, access login information of 
the OCPP server and access token numbers of the charging station users by inserting 
an empty flash drive. In addition to accessing unauthorized data, the attacker could ex-
ploit the charging station by modifying the data and updating the system according to 
their need. Unauthorized access to ID card numbers, imitation of the EV user, illegal use 
of transaction for which the real account holder is accounted for, unauthorized root ac-
cess to charging station, open charging ports and interfaces, and unauthorized charging 
requests are the issues related to the current charging station existing across the globe. 
[2.]  It is for this reason that security considerations must be part of the design process. 
In 2014, two tech professionals developed a tool that hijacked a Jeep over the internet. 
With the help of the tool they could gain full control of a Jeep Cherokee even with the 
driver instead. In another report published by Rapid7, described set of vulnerabilities 
exploited on IoT enabled Baby Monitor based on: physical access to the device, direct 
access to the local area network (LAN), and via the internet [3].  
IoT being natural evolution of computing and enabler of smart infrastructure, EV charging 
infrastructure must be driven by these Internet connected technologies to sustain in the 
current as well as in the future market. However, fragmentation of standards and security 
concerns in heterogenous IoT market, brings huge challenges on maintaining safety, 
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security and privacy of the customers [1]. According to OWASP IoT Testing guidance 
[4], insecure web interface, lack of transport encryption, insufficient security configurabil-
ity, poor physical security, insufficient authentication & authorization, insecure cloud in-
terface, insecure software and firmware, privacy concerns, insecure mobile interface, 
insecure network interface are the attack threats that an IoT enabled infrastructure are 
exposed to [4]. 
It is essential to cope these challenges right from the first phase of product development. 
Security and privacy must be embedded into every standard protocol and processes that 
touches the EV charging infrastructure. The project aims at designing and developing 
smart IoT driven fast charging infrastructure by identifying potential security threats and 
risks, and finally, developing baseline security measures to mitigate the identified threats 
and risks associated with the relevant infrastructure. 
3 Materials and Methods 
The design part of the thesis was carried out based on the study published by ENISA 
[1]. The purpose behind choosing ENISA recommendations was because it covered ex-
isting European Union (EU) policies, regulatory initiatives such as the Directive on secu-
rity of network and information systems (NIS Directive), The EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), as well as the work of the Alliance for the Internet of Things and the 
Staff Working Document on ICT Standardization.   
ENISA [1, p. 12] presented the baseline security measures after identifying, reviewing, 
thoroughly analyzing and comparing existing IoT security practices, security guidelines, 
relevant industry standards and research initiatives in the field of IoT security for Critical 
Information Infrastructures. 
The IoT high-level reference model presented by ENISA [1, p.25] is used to develop ref-
Terence model for the whole charging ecosystem that defines assets in EV charging 
system and assist in identifying threats and attacks associated with the system. Further-
more, the asset taxonomy and threat taxonomy related to the project was prepared ac-
cording to the study carried out by ENISA. Having analyzed assets and threat taxonomy, 
baseline security guidelines are incorporated to prevent risks associated with the whole 
EV charging system. 
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4 Theoretical Background 
4.1 Difference between AC and DC charging 
The time consumed by electric vehicle to charge an EV depends upon the power sup-
plied and the battery capacity of an electric vehicle.  
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 (𝑃) = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑉) 𝑋 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐼) 
However, due to fixed limited voltage on AC charging, for instance 400 volts in Europe, 
the only way to achieve higher power supply for charging depends upon the amount of 
current. The amount of current flow is limited as higher current requires greater cross 
section of the copper wire that contributes in the weight and size of the charging cable. 
The weight of the cable must be lighter enough so that the EV user doesn’t find it arduous 
to connect EV to the charging station. 
Figure 2: AC and DC charging in Electric Vehicle [2] 
As can be seen in Figure 2, every vehicle requires on board charger inside a vehicle to 
accomplish AC charging whereas in case of DC charging the vehicle doesn’t require on 
board charger. The on-board charger results in adding complexity and weight to the EV. 
The DC charging station encompass the on-board charger which overcome the issue 
related to AC charging requirement to include on-board charger in the EV. Although DC 
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charging approach prevents the disadvantages of AC charging, it requires real time com-
munication between EV and EVSE interface to ensure correct charging state. In case of 
AC charging, the EV performs the charging control itself whereas in the case of DC 
charging, the charger located in the EVSE performs the charging control. 
AC charging, also known as slow charger, is suitable at home and could take 8 to 12 
hours to fully charge a EV. On the other hand, DC charger is suitable at public places 
such as kiosks, parking places and could charge the electric vehicle in 15 to 30 min 
depending upon the power supplied by the charging station and the battery capacity. 
4.2 Modes of Conductive Charging  
The international standard IEC 61851[5] defines 4 types of conductive charging with the 
following characteristics: 
4.2.1 Mode 1 (AC) 
Mode 1 AC uses a standard plug of maximum current 16 ampere (A) per phase. [6] The 
Electric vehicle is connected to the AC network using standard power connections. The 
maximum power demand, according to industrial specification, for three phases is spec-
ified 11kW.  This type of conductive charging requires earth leakage and circuit breaker 
protection during installation. 
4.2.2 Mode 2 (AC) 
Mode 2 AC use a standard plug of maximum current 32 A per phase. The maximum 
power demand, according to industrial specification, for three phases is specified 22 kilo 
watt (kW). The EV is connected using special cable with intermediate electronic device 
with pilot control function and protections. This type of conductive charging requires earth 
leakage and circuit breaker protection during installation. [6.] 
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4.2.3 Mode 3 (AC) 
Mode 3 AC use a special plug where maximum current is in accordance with the con-
nector used to connect EV with power outlet. This type of conductive charging includes 
protection in the infrastructure. [6.] 
4.2.4 Mode 4 (DC) 
Mode 4, known as DC Charge, where maximum current to be supplied to the EV depends 
upon the connector type and charging station. The protection is installed in the charging 
infrastructure. The power equipment, security and control functionality is implemented in 
the charging station [6]. The thesis project uses Mode 4 charging for conductive charg-
ing. 
4.3 EV Chargers Connectors 
The OEM fast charging standards in the current market include CCS, which is based on 
IEC standard, and CHAdeMO that is based on Japanese CHAdeMO protocol.  
4.3.1 Combined Charging System (CCS) 
CCS, an integrated electric architecture that implements all relevant AC and DC charging 
scenario, includes the connector and the inlet combination as well as all the control func-
tions [7].  
CCS uses Power Line Communication (PLC) protocol for communication. The vehicle 
inlet constitutes two additional pins that allow DC charging in the same vehicle inlet while 
accepting the legacy AC connector. 
There are two different type of CCS core, known as Type 1 and Type 2, implemented in 
the USA and Europe respectively. Type 1 core is implemented in the USA whereas in 
the type 2 core is implemented in the latter one. Type 1 socket is based on SAEJ1772 
standard while Type 2 is based on IEC standard. All members of European Association 
of Automotive Manufacturers (ACEA), such as BMW, DAF, Daimler, Ford of Europe, 
Hyundai Motor Europe, Jaguar, support CCS for Europe.   
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The main key features of the Combined Charging System include the following: - 
1) AC charging 
The electrical interface specification for power transmission is based on IEC 
61851-1 standard. The type 2 connector, also known as combo 2 connector, is 
based on the international IEC 61851-2 standard [6]. 
2) DC Charging 
The electrical interface specification for power transmission during DC charging com-
plies with the international IEC 61851-23 standard [8]. The type 2 connector is com-
pliant with the international IEC 62196-3 standard [9]. 
3)  Communication interface  
The international standard ISO/IEC 15118 [10] and the German DIN SPEC 
70121:2014-12 [11] describes the DC specific communication between electric vehi-
cle and charging spot. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: - Type 1 and Type 2 CCS Charger Connector [3] 
As can be seen in figure 3, the left picture represents the inlet and outlet for Type 1 
connectors which is also known as Combo 1 connectors. The right one represents the 
inlet and outlet for Type 2 connectors which is also known as Combo 1 connectors. The 
bottom two pin located in vehicle inlet is used to achieve DC charging. 
10 
  
4.3.2 CHAdeMO 
CHAdeMO is a DC charging standard that was formed by the Tokyo Electric Power Com-
pany, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Fuji that follows the Japanese CHAdeMO protocol [12]. The 
CHAdeMO standard supporting car manufacturer have separate vehicles inlet for AC 
and DC charging. Compared to CSS, CHAdeMO only supports DC charging. Unlike 
CCS, CHAdeMO implements Controller Area Network (CAN) communication protocol to 
communicate between EV and EVSE controller. 
4.4 Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) 
The EV charging station, also known as EVSE, as a part of EV infrastructure contains 
electrical conductors and charging equipment external to the electric vehicle. The charg-
ing equipment allows the connection between EV and charging station’s power source 
to provide EV charging [13]. 
4.5 Charging Communication between EV and EVSE 
The charging communication between EV and EVSE is based on OSI layered architec-
ture. The digital communication between these two entities is specified on DIN SPEC 
70121:2014-12 [11] which is based on ISO /IEC15118[10]. ISO15118 enables DC charg-
ing control as well as conductive charging control. The standard delineates the commu-
nication between generic equipment of EV called Electric Vehicle Communication Con-
troller (EVCC) and generic equipment of EVSE called Supply Equipment Communication 
Controller (SECC). Moreover, it provides a general summary and common understand-
ing of aspects influencing the charge process, payment and load levelling [10] [11].  
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Figure 4: Protocol stack for DC charging control [4, p. 17] 
The figure above illustrates the OSI layered architecture implemented for digital commu-
nication between EV and EVSE as specified in DIN SPEC 70121 [11]. As can be seen 
in figure 4, the communication process is divided into seven layers. As physical layer in 
OSI model defines connectors and interface specifications, the EV is connected to EVSE 
using charging cable in layer 1. The OSI model allows charging station to access the 
network to send and receive messages using Ethernet that is covered by Home plug 
GreenPHY specification. In the physical and data-link layer as can be seen in Figure 4, 
Power Line Communication is used. Ipv6 protocol is used on top of the PLC. Moreover, 
UDP and TCP protocols are implemented for the transport layer. ISO/IEC 15118[10] de-
fine V2G2P protocol for the session management between EVCC and SECC. The mes-
sages are delivered from transport layer to session layer in the form of V2GTP packets. 
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The V2GTP packets is comprised of two packets: SDP and application message. The 
EVCC in EV broadcasts SDP packet and wait for the reply from SECC in EVSE. The 
reply received from EVCC contains IP address and communication port of the SECC. As 
XML brings flexibility and portability, the application message is delineated in XML. How-
ever, the actual message in transit is encoded by the EXI algorithm [14]. To accomplish 
confidentiality and integrity of the application message, TLS must be implemented to 
authenticate EVSE. Overall, the figure presents the protocol requirements right from 
physical layer to the application layer. 
4.6 Internet of Things (IoT) 
IoT is beginning to transform the business, industry, society; and thus, impacting the life 
we are living by offering convenience, efficiency and safety to a new level. The analyst 
firm Gartner [15] has estimated that by 2020 IoT adoption will rise estimating 25 billion 
connected devices and their 44 zettabytes of generated data [16].  
IERC [17, p.28] defines Internet of Things as: 
“A dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities 
based on standard and interoperable communication protocols where 
physical and virtual ‘things’ have identities, physical attributes and virtual 
personalities and use intelligent interfaces, and are seamlessly integrated 
into the information network”. 
 IoT is often defined as a network of physical objects that can interact with other Internet 
enabled systems and devices to share information and perform actions based on manual 
user input or an automated controlling system [18, p.1]. The IoT enabled infrastructure, 
to achieve increased efficiency, must be able to support interconnected system, data, 
and devices between the physical and online world. [18, p.1-2.] 
IoT driven EV charging station offer smart charging solution to electric vehicle users by 
connecting charging station to the cloud and accelerating communication between EV 
users and charging station. For instance, IoT enabled DC charging station enable real 
time communication between EV and EVSE through mobile application from which user 
can make decisions based on real time. 
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5 Risk Assessment 
This section provides considerations and guidance for designing and developing secure 
IoT enabled charging infrastructure. The section starts with preparing High level refer-
ence architecture for EV charging infrastructure. Following the architecture model, the 
assets taxonomy and threat taxonomy are depicted respectively. 
5.1 High Level Reference Architecture Model  
 
Figure 5: High-Level Reference Model for EV Charging System 
Figure 5. illustrates the high-level reference model for EV charging. The reference model 
is composed of devices such as electric cars, electric vehicle supply equipment, cloud 
platform providing services such as backend service, web-based services, mobile pay-
ment, database and storage, mobile devices as well as communication between these 
different components of the EV charging system. It shows the security controls that need 
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to be implemented to all the elements of the model to develop secure IoT based EV 
charging infrastructure. 
 
The reference model is useful to identify assets, threats and risks associated with the EV 
charging infrastructure. Furthermore, the reference model contemplates security and pri-
vacy measures across all areas, including device and user identity, authentication and 
authorization and data protection for data in rest and data in motion. 
 
Moreover, asset taxonomy and threat taxonomy presented in ENISA study, is adhered 
according to the requirement of the project to devise foundation security guidelines for 
the whole EV charging ecosystem.  
15 
  
5.2 Asset Taxonomy 
The first step to tackle cyber security is to identify the assets associated with the IoT 
ecosystem. This section provides an overview of the key asset groups and assets to be 
protected in the EV charging infrastructure.  
           Figure 6:  Asset taxonomy  
The asset taxonomy depicted in Figure 6 categorize the assets associated with EV 
charging infrastructure in different key asset groups. The IoT device asset group consists 
of hardware devices, from which the IoT devices are built, and software that runs on 
these hardware devices. The EV charging infrastructure include hardware such control-
lers and software such as operating systems, firmware, programs and applications run-
ning on IoT hardware. The other IoT Ecosystem device include device to manage IoT 
devices mentioned in IoT device asset group. The communication asset group include 
communication protocols, either wireless; Wi-Fi, MQTT, Narrowband IoT, ZigBee, CoAP 
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or wireline based; Ethernet, I2C, SPI, used to communicate between IoT devices as well 
as between IoT devices and the cloud platform.  
The infrastructure asset group consists of power supply that supplies power to IoT de-
vices. In addition to power supply it includes security assets which provide security to 
IoT devices, networks and information. These apparently include firewalls, Cloud Access 
Security Broker (CASB) s for protecting cloud and authentication/ authorization system. 
[1, p. 27] 
The platform and backend asset group include web based services for accessing web-
based applications and cloud infrastructure that offer services such as backend, data-
base and storage. The decision-making asset group is comprised of algorithms and ser-
vices to process collected data from EVSE controller into a defined structure for further 
analysis in cloud to assist in making decision while charging electric car.   
The Application and services asset group include data analytic and visualization that 
assist in identifying new patterns and improve efficiency of the infrastructure. It includes 
device and network management service for software updates, monitoring and asset 
tracking and device usage service.  
The Information asset group is composed of data: at rest, which is information stored in 
a database in the cloud backend, or in the EVSE components; in transit, which is infor-
mation sent or exchanged through the network between IoT elements; and in use, which 
is information used by mobile application, electric car or IoT element. 
The research carried out by [1, p.29], shows that the most critical assets are sensors, 
device and network management controls, communication protocols, the gateways and 
application and services. It is important to understand challenges and threats when ad-
dressing security in EV charging infrastructure’s assets.  
5.3 Threat Taxonomy 
Threat modelling is core of a secure development methodology. The emergence of IoT 
technologies and products is constantly changing landscape. It is hence important to 
ensure the reference to a set of threats and issues to address appropriately.              
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According to ENISA Threat Taxonomy [19, p.1], threat taxonomy, categorization of threat 
types and threats at various level of detail, establishes a point of reference for threats 
encountered, while providing a possibility to mix, order, repair and detail threat definition. 
[19, p.1] The figure depicts the threat taxonomy focused on the EV charging system. 
 
     Figure 7: Threat Taxonomy 
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As can be seen in Figure 7, the threats associated with EV charging Infrastructure’s 
assets are divided in to high level threats and the threats that are part of these high-level 
threats. The high-level threats include; nefarious/activity abuse, eavesdropping, outages, 
damage/loss, failures /malfunctions, disaster and physical attacks. The nefarious activity/ 
abuse category consists of threats such as DDoS attack, malware, exploit kits, targeted 
attacks, attacks on privacy, modification of information and counterfeit by malicious de-
vices. Man-in-the middle attack, IoT communication protocol hijacking, interception of 
message; using rogue hardware and software, session hijacking; charging session, re-
play of messages are the threats that fall under high level threat called Eavesdropping/In-
terception/Hijacking. The outage threat considers all the threat related to network outage, 
devices failure, loss of cloud services, failure of system. The physical attack includes 
device modification; which is caused by bad configuration ports or open ports and device 
destruction. The disaster threat includes natural disaster such as flood, heavy snowfall 
or rainfall, and environmental disaster that could physically damage the devices. The 
loss of sensitive information belongs to high level damage threat. The software vulnera-
bilities such as configuration error, software bugs, weak authentication, weak cryptog-
raphy belong to failures/malfunctions threat group. In addition to software vulnerabilities, 
failures include third party failures from ISP, cloud service provider, power utility provider 
and remote maintenance provider.  
All these threats affect EV charging ecosystem devices such as controllers. In addition 
to that, it affects cloud platform, communication, backend, application and services pro-
vided by the cloud platform, and as well as, decision making capability of the whole sys-
tem. 
The research result by ENISA [1, p.33] presents IoT threat impacts in three level: crucial, 
high and medium. The result shows that Malware, Exploit kits, sensitive data leakage, 
weak passwords and DDoS attacks have crucial impact on the IoT based system. The 
research reports that eavesdropping and attacks on privacy have high impact on the 
system and other threats such as network outage, advanced persistent threat and coun-
terfeit by malicious devices are considered to have medium impact on the system. To 
secure design and develop smart DC charging system which use IoT technology to im-
plement the infrastructure, it is significant to create detail list of security measures that 
aim to mitigate threats, vulnerabilities and risks identified in the EV charging system. 
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6 Proposed Solution 
Following asset taxonomy and threat taxonomy performed on IoT enabled EV charging 
infrastructure, the thesis project had considered following requirement for designing se-
cure EV charging system. The security policies (Appendix 1) and technical measures 
(Appendix 2), based on ENISA [1, p.82-87] baseline security guidelines, list policies and 
technical measures mapping to the threats existing in the EV charging system. These 
policies and technical measures, aim to mitigate the threats, vulnerabilities and risks 
identified in the IoT driven EV charging system, are going to be analyzed and imple-
mented during the building phase of the project.  
The thesis project had considered the following products defined by internationally rec-
ognized standardizing bodies.  
Table 2 : Standard for DC Charging Station and EV Connecters and the Communication 
standard between EV and charging standard 
  
Table 1 list all the required standard to connect EV with the charging station. Further-
more, it describes what the standard covers. The table includes the standard for accom-
plishing communication between EV and DC charging station. 
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In addition to the standard for equipment’s, the project, had considered following net-
working protocols that need to be analyzed during building phase of the system. 
    Table 2: - Network Protocols considered for IoT driven DC Charging Station 
 
Table 2 illustrates the communication protocol used on different multi-layer stack of the 
OSI architecture. The datalink layer connects two IoT components, for instance EVSE’s 
gateway to IoT platform or EV to EVSE controller. Furthermore, it presents protocols 
such as RPL, 6LowPAN for routing and session layer protocols to enable messaging 
among various elements of the EV charging IoT communication subsystem. 
The thesis project during designing phase has come up with prototype method for IoT 
charging station implementation in which the security measures remain to be applied. 
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Figure 8: -  Flowchart showing method for IoT driven EV charging Station. 
The purpose system comprises of an Internet of Things hub, to be communica-
tively coupled to a charging station. The EVSE comprised of microcontroller which act 
as IoT hub establish a communication channel with the IoT service. The user device di-
rectly communicates to the IoT cloud service. 
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Figure 9: - System and Method for an IoT Charging Station Implementation  
The IoT hub connect to the cloud service through he internet. As can be seen in, Fig-
ures 8 and 9, an EV user drives in to the charging station. From the mobile application 
installed in the EV user device, a secure communication channel with the IoT cloud 
service is established and authenticated with the cloud service. In this representation, 
the user’s location may be determined using GPS or other location technology. Moreo-
ver, the user may be requested the charging station ID to enter via the user device ap-
plication that helps in identifying the charging station. Once the user is identified, a pay-
ment service on the cloud service initiates a payment transaction with an external pay-
ment service such as PayPal, a credit card company, or the user’s bank account. Once 
the payment transaction is authorized by the payment service, the cloud service trans-
mits a command to the IoT hub in EVSE to authorize the connected EV of the user and 
allow the use of the charging station. After the EV is authorized, the charging starts and 
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bidirectional communication between EV and EVSE is achieved according to the pro-
cedures defined in standard DIN SPEC 70121[10] and ISO 15118[9]. The IoT hub at 
the charging station will transmit the cost of the electrical power to the IoT cloud service 
which will forward a message to the payment service to complete the transaction and 
pay for the electricity. If the payment service is a bank account, then the amount will be 
deducted from the user’s account. The communication between the charging station 
and the IoT service occur via the user’s mobile phone. 
7 Conclusion 
Today’s rapid development in the field of IoT driven infrastructures have created oppor-
tunities for manufactures to claim their stake in the market by building the products for 
these infrastructures. However, with IoT still evolving, lack of well-defined IoT platform, 
vulnerabilities with IoT devices, communication and network protocols, lack of privacy 
and interoperability, manufacturers or companies developing IoT solutions must pay 
serious attention on designing secure IoT infrastructure to cope with above mentioned 
issues before launching their products.  
Moreover, the IoT enabled product developed without affording time and effort on secu-
rity, are open to exploitation or security breach by the attacker, and finally, require ex-
tensive effort and cost to amend it.  It is, therefore, essential to prepare high level 
model architecture and perform asset analysis and threat analysis associated with the 
infrastructure during the design phase. The project presented the action that need to be 
taken to develop secure relevant infrastructure. The project need for detailing all the 
entities such as EV, EVSE, or cloud platform, communication, and deciding security 
controls on these elements were crucial before building and developing the infrastruc-
ture. Furthermore, the thesis presented the high model architecture of EV charging In-
frastructure which delineated security controls: authentication, authorization, access 
control, availability, encryption, integrity, secure communication and non-repudiation, 
applied to every entity of IoT driven charging infrastructure. The project detailed all the 
entities and security controls; to ease IoT driven EV charging infrastructure develop-
ment. Based on asset identification, threats associated with the charging station were 
mapped according to their impacts on the assets of the infrastructure. Following threat 
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analysis, depending upon the criticality of the threats on IoT driven EV charging infra-
structure security measures presented in ENISA were considered for implementation 
during building phase. Without this research it would not have been possible to detail 
all the security baseline recommendation for the design and development of the related 
infrastructure.  
The baseline security recommendation presented by ENISA were studied and applied 
accordingly to achieve secure IoT enabled charging infrastructure. The standard net-
work protocols defined for IoT are to be analyzed and implemented during building 
phase and decided according to the agility of the project. To summarize, based on the 
criticality of the threats, security measures comprised of: policies; that must be consid-
ered when developing devices, and finally, technical measures; that assist in reducing 
the potential risks that IoT enabled charging infrastructure are subject to, are to be ap-
plied before deploying the charging station. 
In addition to, the thesis project presented the importance of DC charging station over 
AC charging station to encourage people to adopt electric vehicle over traditional gaso-
line cars and boost IoT based EV charging infrastructure economy. However, time con-
sumed to charge an EV; which could take 8 to 12 hours depending upon the AC 
chargers type, requirement to have on board charger in the car to support AC charging 
are the issues that need to overcome before people choose EV over traditional vehicle. 
The thesis project has considered to implement CCS chargers to offer DC charging for 
electric vehicle as it overcomes the issue of AC charging and provide quick and smart 
solution to EV users.    
The thesis project can be used to carry out to build pilot prototype of the IoT enabled 
DC charging station before building the main product or solution. The project list all the 
equipment’s and communication procedures, defined by International Standard Bodies, 
to be implemented to achieve DC charging service for electric vehicles.  
The case company should apply the security measures on the purposed method for an 
IoT charging station implementation. The security measures incorporate policies and 
technical measures to protect all the process in the IoT implementation starting from 
EVSE’s device, network protocols; for connecting EVSE to cloud service, authentica-
tion of EV user to the IoT cloud platform, authorization of charging station from IoT to 
allow connected EV to start charging procedures. The project during implementation 
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phase could analyze PKI infrastructure solution to secure smart EV charging infrastruc-
ture by using digital certificate to authenticate a EVSE, system or network, encrypt all 
communications, and uphold data integrity. Furthermore, PKI can be incorporated dur-
ing product design, build, deployment, or on ongoing maintenance. 
Whether dealing with smart charging system or connected manufacturing facilities, 
sensors and robotics are now beginning to work hand in hand towards the accomplish-
ment of objectives. New research in blockchain technology shows promise in extending 
these capabilities in EV charging infrastructure. These capabilities are driving the hu-
man out of the decision-making loop in many instances and as we rely on IoT products 
to do the basic thinking for us, we will need to make sure that those products and their 
associated services and interconnection points are each developed as securely as pos-
sible. 
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Security Measures (Policies) and Threats Mapping 
 
Design Security 
Control 
 
Security Measures / Good Practices/ Policies 
 
Threat Groups 
 
 
Security by De-
sign  
GP-PS-01: Consider the security of the whole IoT sys-
tem in a consistent and holistic approach during its 
whole lifecycle across all levels of device/application 
design and development, integrating security through-
out the development, manufacture, and deployment. 
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
  GP-PS-02: Ensure the ability to integrate different se-
curity policies and techniques.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
  GP-PS-03: Security must consider the risk posed to 
human safety  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
 GP-PS-04: Designing for power conservation should 
not compromise security  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
  GP-PS-05: Design architecture by compartments to 
encapsulate elements in case of attacks.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
  GP-PS-06: For IoT hardware manufacturers and IoT 
software developers it is necessary to implement test 
plans to verify whether the product performs as it is 
expected. Penetration tests help to identify malformed 
input handling, authentication bypass attempts and 
overall security posture.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
  GP-PS-07: For IoT software developers it is important 
to conduct code review during implementation as it 
helps to reduce bugs in a final version of a product.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse  
      
Appendix 1 
  2 (2) 
 
  
 
 
Privacy by De-
sign 
GP-PS-08: Make Privacy an integral part of the sys-
tem 
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse  
Damage loss (IT as-
sets).                                    
  GP-PS-08: Perform privacy impact assessments be-
fore any new application are launched 
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, 
Damage loss (IT as-
sets).                                        
      
 
 
Asset Manage-
ment 
GP-PS-10: Establish and maintain asset management 
procedures and configuration controls for key network 
and information systems.  
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Damage loss 
(IT assets), Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                             
      
Risk and Threats 
Identification and 
Assessment 
GP-PS-11: Identify significant risks using a defense-
in-depth approach  
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Outages.                                        
  GP-PS-12: Identify the intended use and environment 
of a given IoT device  
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Failures / 
malfunctions, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                           
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Security Measures (Technical Measures) and Threats Mapping 
 
Design Security 
Control 
 
Security Measures / Good Practices/ 
Technical Measures 
 
Threat Groups 
 
Hardware security 
GP-TM-01: Employ a hardware-based immu-
table root of trust.  
Physical Attacks,   
Disasters, Outages                                                           
  GP-TM-02: Use hardware that incorporates 
security features to strengthen the protection 
and integrity of the device - specialized secu-
rity chips / coprocessors that integrate secu-
rity at the transistor level, embedded in the 
processor, providing, among other things, a 
trusted storage of device identity and authen-
tication means, protection of keys at rest and 
in use, and preventing unprivileged from ac-
cessing to security sensitive code. Protection 
against local and physical attacks can be 
covered via functional security.  
Physical Attacks, 
Disasters, Outages.                                                         
      
 
Trust and Integrity 
Management 
GP-TM-03: The boot process initializes the 
main hardware components, and starts the 
operating system. Trust must be established 
in the boot environment before any trust in 
any other software or executable program 
can be claimed.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Outages.                                                            
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  GP-TM-04: Sign code cryptographically to 
ensure it has not been tampered after being 
signed as safe for the device, and implement 
run-time protection and secure execution 
monitoring to be sure malicious attacks do 
not overwrite code after it is loaded.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking.                                                          
  GP-TM-05: Control the installation of soft-
ware on operational systems, to prevent un-
authenticated software and files being 
loaded onto it.  
Outages, Nefarious 
Activity /Abuse, 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijack-
ing.                                                             
  GP-TM-06: Restore Secure State - Enable a 
system to return to a state that is known to 
be secure, after a security breach occurs or if 
an upgrade is not successful.  
Outages, Nefarious 
Activity /Abuse, 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-07: Use protocols and mechanisms 
able to represent and manage trust and trust 
relationships.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
      
 
Strong default secu-
rity and privacy 
GP-TM-08: Enable security by default. Any 
applicable security features should be ena-
bled by default, and any unused or insecure 
functionalities should be disabled by default.  
Outages, Nefarious 
Activity /Abuse, Fail-
ures / Malfunctions.                                                            
  GP-TM-09: Establish hard to crack device in-
dividual default passwords.  
Outages, Nefarious 
Activity /Abuse, Fail-
ures / Malfunctions.                                                            
      
Appendix 2 
  3 (11) 
 
  
 
Data protection and 
compliance 
GP-TM-10: Personal data must be collected 
and processed fairly and lawfully. The fair-
ness principle specifically requires that per-
sonal data should never be collected and 
processed without the user’s consent. 
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Damage loss 
(IT assets).                                      
  GP-TM-11: Make sure that personal data is 
used for the specified purposes for which 
they were collected, and that any further pro-
cessing of personal data is compatible and 
that the data subjects are well informed. 
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Damage loss 
(IT assets).                                      
  GP-TM-12: Minimize the data collected and 
retained.  
Damage loss (IT as-
sets).                                      
  GP-TM-13: IoT stakeholders must be compli-
ant with the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).  
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Damage loss 
(IT assets).                                       
  GP-TM-14: Users must be able to exercise 
their rights to information, access, erasure, 
rectification, data portability, restriction of 
processing, objection to processing, and 
their right not to be evaluated on the basis of 
automated processing.  
Nefarious Activity / 
Abuse, Damage loss 
(IT assets).                                       
      
 
System safety and 
reliability 
GP-TM-15: Design with system and opera-
tional disruption in mind, preventing the sys-
tem from causing unacceptable risk of injury 
or physical damage.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Disasters, Out-
ages.                                                         
  GP-TM-16: Mechanisms for self-diagnosis 
and self-repair/healing to recover from fail-
ure, malfunction or a compromised state. 
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, 
Outages.                                                        
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  GP-TM-17: Ensure standalone operation - 
essential features should continue to work 
with a loss of communications and chronicle 
negative impacts from compromised devices 
or cloud-based systems. 
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, 
Outages.                                                        
      
 
 
 
Secure Software / 
Firmware updates 
GP-TM-18: Ensure that the device soft-
ware/firmware, its configuration and its appli-
cations have the ability to update Over-The-
Air (OTA), that the update server is secure, 
that the update file is transmitted via a se-
cure connection, that it does not contain sen-
sitive data (e.g. hardcoded credentials), and 
that it is signed by an authorized trust entity 
and encrypted using accepted encryption 
methods, and that the update package has 
its digital signature, signing certificate and 
signing certificate chain, verified by the de-
vice before the update process begins.  
Outages, Failures / 
Malfunctions, Nefari-
ous Activity / Abuse, 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijack-
ing.                                                          
  GP-TM-19: Offer an automatic firmware up-
date mechanism  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Outages                                                         
  GP-TM-20: Backward compatibility of firm-
ware updates. Automatic firmware updates 
should not modify user-configured prefer-
ences, security, and/or privacy settings with-
out user notification. 
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, 
Outages.                                                        
      
Appendix 2 
  5 (11) 
 
  
 
 
Authentication 
GP-TM-21: Design the authentica-
tion and authorization schemes (unique per 
device) based on the system-level threat 
models.  
Failures / 
Malfunction 
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-22: Ensure default passwords and 
even default usernames are changed during 
the initial setup, and that weak, null or blank 
passwords are not allowed.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
  GP-TM-23: Authentication mechanisms must 
use strong passwords or personal identifica-
tion numbers (PINs), and should consider 
using two-factor authentication (2FA) or 
multi-factor authentication (MFA) like 
Smartphones, Biometrics, etc., and certifi-
cates  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
  GP-TM-24: Authentication credentials includ-
ing but not limited to user passwords shall be 
salted, hashed and/or encrypted.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
  GP-TM-25: Protect against ‘brute force’ 
and/or other abusive login attempts. This 
protection should also consider keys stored 
in devices.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
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  GP-TM-26: Ensure password recovery or re-
set mechanism is robust and does not supply 
an attacker with information indicating a valid 
account. The same applies to key update 
and recovery mechanisms  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
      
 
 
Authoriza-
tion 
GP-TM-27: Limit the permissions of actions 
allowed for a given system by Implementing 
fine-grained authorization mechanisms and 
using the Principle of least privilege (POLP): 
applications must operate at the lowest privi-
lege level possible.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
  GP-TM-28: Device firmware should be de-
signed to isolate privileged code and data 
from portions of the firmware that do not 
need access to them, and device hardware 
should provide isolation concepts to prevent 
unprivileged from accessing security sensi-
tive code. 
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                            
      
 
Access Control - 
Physical and Envi-
ronmental security 
GP-TM-29: Data integrity and confidentiality 
must be enforced by access controls. When 
the subject requesting access has been au-
thorized to access particular process, it is 
necessary to enforce the defined security 
policy. 
Physical Attacks, 
Failures / Malfunc-
tions, Nefarious Ac-
tivity / Abuse, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking.                                                          
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  GP-TM-30: Ensure a context-based security 
and privacy that reflects different levels of 
importance.  
Damage / Loss (IT 
Assets), Failures / 
Malfunctions, Nefari-
ous Activity / Abuse, 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijack-
ing.                                                          
  GP-TM-31: Measures for tamper protection 
and detection. Detection and reaction to 
hardware tampering should not rely on net-
work connectivity. 
Physical Attacks, Ne-
farious Activity / 
Abuse                                                            
  GP-TM-32: Ensure that the device cannot be 
easily disassembled and that the data stor-
age medium is encrypted at rest and cannot 
be easily removed. 
Physical Attacks, Ne-
farious Activity / 
Abuse                                                            
  GP-TM-33: Ensure that devices only feature 
the essential physical external ports (such as 
USB) necessary for them to function and that 
the test/debug modes are secure, so they 
cannot be used to maliciously access the de-
vices. In general, lock down physical ports to 
only trusted connections.  
Physical Attacks, 
Failures / Malfunc-
tions, Eavesdropping 
/ Interception / Hi-
jacking                                                             
      
 
 
 
 
Cryptography 
GP-TM-34: Ensure a proper and effective 
use of cryptography to protect the confidenti-
ality, authenticity and/or integrity of data and 
information (including control messages), in 
transit and in rest. Ensure the proper selec-
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
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tion of standard and strong encryption algo-
rithms and strong keys, and disable insecure 
protocols. Verify the robustness of the imple-
mentation. 
  GP-TM-35: Cryptographic keys must be se-
curely managed.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-36: Build devices to be compatible 
with lightweight encryption and security tech-
niques.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-37: Support scalable key manage-
ment schemes  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Failures / 
Malfunctions, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking                                                             
      
 
Secure and trusted 
communications 
GP-TM-38: Guarantee the different security 
aspects -confidentiality (privacy), integrity, 
availability and authenticity- of the infor-
mation in transit on the networks or stored in 
the IoT application or in the Cloud.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Failures / 
Malfunctions, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-39: Ensure that communication se-
curity is provided using state-of-the-art, 
standardized security protocols, such as TLS 
for encryption. 
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijack-
ing, Damage loss (IT 
assets).                                       
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  GP-TM-40: Ensure credentials are not ex-
posed in internal or external network traffic.  
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijack-
ing, Damage loss (IT 
assets).                                       
  GP-TM-41: Guarantee data authenticity to 
enable reliable exchanges from data emis-
sion to data reception. Data should always 
be signed whenever and wherever it is cap-
tured and stored. 
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-42: Do not trust data received and al-
ways verify any interconnections. Discover, 
identify and verify/authenticate the devices 
connected to the network before trust can be 
established, and preserve their integrity for 
reliable solutions and services.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Failures / 
Malfunctions, Eaves-
dropping / Intercep-
tion / Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-43: IoT devices should be restrictive 
rather than permissive in communicating.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-44: Make intentional connections. 
Prevent unauthorized connections to it or 
other devices the product is connected to, at 
all levels of the protocols.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
  GP-TM-45: Disable specific ports and/or net-
work connections for selective connectivity.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
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  GP-TM-46: Rate limiting – controlling the 
traffic sent or received by a network to re-
duce the risk of automated attacks.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Eavesdrop-
ping / Interception / 
Hijacking                                                             
      
 
Secure Interfaces 
and network ser-
vices 
GP-TM-47: Risk Segmentation. Splitting net-
work elements into separate components to 
help isolate security breaches and minimize 
the overall risk.  
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijacking  
  GP-TM-48: Protocols should be designed to 
ensure that, if a single device is compro-
mised, it does not affect the whole set.  
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijacking  
  GP-TM-49: Avoid provisioning the same se-
cret key in an entire product family, since 
compromising a single device would be 
enough to expose the rest of the product 
family.  
Eavesdropping / In-
terception / Hijacking  
  GP-TM-50: Ensure only necessary ports are 
exposed and available.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Eavesdropping / 
Interception / Hijack-
ing                                                             
  GP-TM-51: Implement a DDoS-resistant and 
Load-Balancing infrastructure.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse 
  GP-TM-52: Ensure web interfaces fully en-
crypt the user session, from the device to the 
backend services, and that they are not sus-
ceptible to XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, etc.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse 
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  GP-TM-53: Avoid security issues when de-
signing error messages. 
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse 
      
 
Secure input and 
output handling 
GP-TM-54: Data input validation (ensuring 
that data is safe prior to use) and output fil-
tering.  
Failures / Malfunc-
tion, Nefarious Activ-
ity /Abuse                                                          
 
Logging 
GP-TM-55: Implement a logging system that 
records events relating to user authentica-
tion, management of accounts and access 
rights, modifications to security rules, and the 
functioning of the system.  
Damage loss (IT as-
sets).    
      
 
Monitoring and Au-
diting 
GP-TM-56: Implement regular monitoring to 
verify the device behavior, to detect malware 
and to discover integrity errors.  
Damage loss (IT as-
sets).    
  GP-TM-57: Conduct periodic audits and re-
views of security controls to ensure that the 
controls are effective. Perform penetration 
tests at least biannually.  
Nefarious Activity 
/Abuse, Damage 
Loss (IT assets).                      
 
 
 
 
 
